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Abstract— Wide scale interest and adoption of Internet of
Things (IoT) technologies is fuelling innovation in the way
individuals and even machines can interact to exchange knowl-
edge. One area of particular interest is that of analytics. Ever-
decreasing form factor hardware is enabling computation and
data storage to be embedded into many different devices. The
combination of network connectivity and emerging distributed
models of service orchestration is allowing the creation of new
ways of measuring, monitoring and analysing performance.
Using an approach inspired by the NIST seven layer model
of cloud computing, we propose a model of connectivity that
enables analytics services to be consumed across individual
system components that are distributed, such as those found
in the IoT and Industrial IoT (IIoT) domains.
Keywords— Cloud computing, distributed systems,
security, authentication, trust, multiparty, Internet of
Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of opportunity offered by the Internet of
Things (IoT) is providing new ways to embed computation
and storage into everyday devices. Reductions in the cost
of hardware, coupled with technological advancements, are
enabling a constant stream of innovative new products and
services that rely upon IoT architectures. Such developments
are particularly evident in the ‘wearable’ and healthcare in-
dustries, with parallel innovations occurring in the Industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT) [1], [2].
Along with the ability to sense environments, conditions
and processes, comes the requirement to measure, monitor,
analyse and evaluate performance. As such, Business Intelli-
gence (BI) is undergoing a resurgence as consumer demand
moves beyond traditional dashboards through forecasting, to-
wards prescriptive analytics. Of late, vendors have delivered
BI often as a flexible, on-demand service, making use of the
underlying elastic cloud platforms that enterprise software
applications are typically deployed upon [4], [10], [5], [3].
Advancements in technology have increased the ability
to connect such a variety of embedded devices to larger
pools of resources such as clouds. Integrating embedded
devices and cloud servers raises an important discussion
regarding the nature of data generated or transmitted by IoT
devices. These approaches must be secure and provide the
necessary privacy controls for users. At present, the security
and privacy concerns created by these devices play a central
role in the successful integration of these two technologies
[6].
The heterogeneous nature of IoT environments makes it
much harder to detect the insider and outsider attacks in such
universal platforms [7].
Experiences with clouds, especially those that have public
or hybrid architectures, illustrates that cloud services and
applications require multi-layered approaches to external and
internal threats to security. This is most pertinent in the
IIoT environment, where business systems contain valuable
Intellectual Property (IP) that can only be protected by
retaining tight security over working practices.
This article describes a model for delivering analytics
services to and between components such as those encoun-
tered in IoT architectures. A number of adversarial attacks
are simulated to demonstrate the effectiveness of a cloud-
inspired multi-layer security model in the IoT domain.
II. CLOUD COMPUTING MODEL
The core principles of cloud computing: on-demand self-
service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elas-
ticity and service metering (NIST Special Publication 800-
145) [15], make utility computing an attractive proposition
for environments that contain distributed resources. The
NIST definition [12] describes five options for the deploy-
ment of cloud computing as follows: public clouds, private
clouds hosted onsite, private clouds hosted off-site, onsite
community clouds and offsite community clouds.
Abstraction is one of the most compelling motivations
for system architects; this enables myriad heterogeneous
resources to be viewed as a homogeneous whole. Cloud
architectures of any of the five types defined by NIST are
modelled using a framework that consists of seven layers.
The physical infrastructure foundation is layer one, upon
which a resource abstraction (virtualisation) second layer
resides. Layer three is the resource composition layer, and
layer four refers to the Infrastructure as a Service model
(IaaS). Platform as a Service (PaaS) exists on layer five,
Software as a Service (SaaS) on layer seven and finally the
cloud tenants’ applications sit within layer seven [14], [15].
We have considered the application of analytics services in
the context of an enterprise Business Intelligence application
that is likely to be delivered across a heterogeneous network
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of devices. In a cloud environment this is typified by off-
site private or community clouds, whereby multiple disparate
business organisations can host their own enterprise software
services and data repositories in what is, to all intents and
purposes, a set of hardware resources that is dedicated to
each tenant [13], [15]. The tenants access their dedicated
resources via a VPN, thus maintaining clear separation
between corporate services and their respective analytics
implementations. However, should any of the businesses
wish to share services to promote operational efficiencies,
this can be enabled via community-based agreements [13].
We have used the cloud model as inspiration to propose
a multi-layer service-oriented framework that can deliver se-
cure services (such as BI analytics) across distributed infras-
tructure. Security and privacy are key concerns for tenants
of shared cloud infrastructure such as that found in off-site
private and community clouds. The sharing of services such
as malware detection and inoculation has significant benefits
for organisations who may not otherwise have strategies
or the resources to maintain their own defences. We shall
now briefly review services dedicated to security and privacy
within clouds in the following section.
III. SECURE SERVICE DELIVERY
In keeping with the service orientation models described
so far, security as a service can be considered as a multi-layer
framework in itself [9], protecting each layer of the cloud
computing model [16]. Such a service lends itself to a utility
offering in the same way that clouds are rapidly provisioned
and expanded on demand, for a cost that is quantifiable and
chargeable to the consumer.
As described above, resource abstraction through virtual-
isation is a key principle for a cloud-inspired architecture,
and therefore any security and privacy services need to be
made available to all relevant Virtual Machines (VM) for
each client [19], [17].
Therefore, security and privacy control services must be
orchestrated via appropriate service interfaces between each
cloud and its respective tenants that are accessing the services
[19]. This control will be managed by the relevant virtuali-
sation security manager for each VM, and as a consequence
the control must be located within the virtualisation layer.
Privacy is managed via policy resources that need to be
retained securely in a protected space such as a digital vault
for encryption keys or digital certificates and such like [20],
[21], all contained within a tier above other layers such as
authentication and client metadata layers [22], [23].
Any instances whereby session packets do not have the
requisite authority to invoke a particular service interaction
will result in the session being terminated, and is a key
security feature that is embedded within the framework.
IV. MULTI-LAYERED SECURITY MODEL
Our proposed model is illustrated in Figure 1 and describes
the cloud-inspired architecture containing multiple layers.
Each layer incorporates security and privacy services that
Fig. 1. Multilayer hierarchical inter-cloud architecture.
make use of firewalls as gateways for session traffic from
each of the respective clients.
We have implemented the model within Opnet, the de-
scription of which is as follows. Each firewall is represented
by a Cisco PIX 535, which operates across the various layers
including network, transport and application. Access control
lists within the firewalls enable the governance of traffic
based on IP addresses, protocols and ports for common and
bespoke applications.
The firewalls are configured at the application layer to fil-
ter traffic from different URLs, encrypted sessions (HTTPS)
and various clients such as Java, and are able to utilise
Internetwork Key Exchange (IKE) to encrypt all sessions via
DES, 3DES or AES. As an example we have defined four
separate LANs to represent different clients/cloud tenants,
and they each access the cloud through separate firewalls.
To illustrate an adversarial scenario, we have incorporated
a simulated distributed attack from three malicious parties,
who each are attempting to access the network through
independent firewalls. Such an attack is a key concern for
early adopters of IoT technologies, as the pervasive use
of wireless communications presents many opportunities for
business vulnerabilities to be exposed.
All of the multiple layers of the cloud are illustrated in
Figure 2. We have embraced the cloud concept of resource
abstraction and exploited this in the multi-layer model by
representing each of the layers as separate clouds. Within
each cloud layer exists an array of computing hardware
to maximise performance and therefore minimise response
times to service requests. It is an imperative that the model
must not introduce excessive overheads into the normal
functionality of the system.
The cloud layers are arranged such that inbound traffic
from clients are filtered by the firewalls and then passed
through successive layers until the system is satisfied that
the requests can be delivered to the analytics functionality
residing on the cloud applications layer. We now describe
each of the layers and the role that they play within the
model in turn:
• Tenant firewalls. This cloud layer consists of a number
of databases that hold authentication data for each of the
tenants, in order for them to be permitted access to the
VM that have been assigned to them as part of their
subscription. This is the gateway for each session, S to
be invoked.
• Tenant metadata. Beyond the authentication criteria
that is marshalled by the tenant firewalls layer, there
exists further metadata for each client tenant. This
metadata describes the credentials to authorise access
to specific instances of repositories, applications and
services. The detail is embedded within the session
packets and is used to verify whether the session can
continue or not.
• Digital vaults. The vaults are a secure place to retain
digital signatures/certificates and decryption keys so
that only the requisite authorities can access their own
content and services. Public key encryption ensures
that legitimate session requests are honoured and bogus
requests are terminated.
• Intrusion Prevention System. The occurrence of ad-
versarial attacks is not limited to the correct authen-
tication at the start of a session. Intrusion detection
prevents attacks on sessions that are in progress, such as
SQL injection in web forms. This might be considered a
route into the DBMETA or DBVAULT repositories from the
perspective of an adversary. This cloud layer prevents
such activity from continuing.
• Malware protection. Similar to the IPS cloud layer,
an anti-malware layer contiuously montitors for trojan
activity, where malicious exploits are embedded and
concealed within session packets, only to be executed
at the application layer. Records of the monitoring and
detection history are retained within DBANTIMAL.
• Tenant applications. This layer hosts the tenant’s ap-
plications themselves, in this case the analytics func-
tionality of enterprise BI. The preceding layers ensure
that only a marshalled session, S can access this layer,
which in the case of BI potentially provides access to
confidential business operations and performance data.
For some functionality, there will be a requirement for
further authentication from a user, such as an account
and password, etc.
A. Tenant repositories
The final cloud layer hosts the back-end repositories that
serve myriad tenant applications. For an analytics applica-
tion, this would be the databases/data warehouses/data lakes
that retain the underlying business data, together with any
processed data objects for reporting and analysis. These ob-
jects are typically accessed by tenant users through reporting
dashboards and data visualisation suites, abstracting users
away from the complexities of database organisation.
B. Simulation design
We have elected to model and simulate the proposed
system (Figure 2) so that we can examine the operational
Fig. 2. Cloud layers modelled in this work.
characteristics in terms of performance, and its ability to
provide a collection of services that are resilient towards
malicious attacks.
Figure 3 illustrates how the cloud layers have been mapped
to individual profiles. Each profile consists of a collection of
VMs, that host the contents of the model as described in
the previous section, namely: security and privacy services,
tenant applications and repositories.
Fig. 3. Virtual Machines with applications packaged.
V. MODELLING ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
If we now consider an adversarial attack upon the model,
we can see how the system protects against such a sce-
nario. Figure 4 shows the situation where a malicious agent
attempts to infiltrate the system to obtain access to an
authorised tenant’s VM. Whilst the cloud service requires
verification to be able to subscribe and access the remote
Fig. 4. An attack scenario showing the problem.
resources, what appears to be a legitimate tenant could
actually be an adversary that is masquerading as a valid
client, who has the objective of entering the cloud and then
attacking other tenant VMs from within the same cloud.
Tools such as Metasploit can be employed to automate
the delivery of exploits in a rapid fashion. This could enable
a bogus tenant to create surreptitious means of exposing
sensitive data, unbeknown to any other party.
Posing as a legitimate tenant, the adversarial agent would
in this case be attacking from a VM that is authorised and
hosted within the cloud. As such, the conventional cloud
security processes would not be able to detect such activity.
In effect, the activity is obscured by the sheer volume
of VMs that exist within a cloud environment. This is a
significant challenge for cloud service providers, particularly
as service orientation through Microservice Architectures
becomes more prevalent [18]. If we extend this to the IoT do-
main, there is a stronger desire to package functionality into
services, to be hosted on distributed, connected hardware.
Therefore, the ability to successfully address this issue is a
key feature of this work. We propose a solution whereby
the collection of VMs are organised into a hierarchy, as
Figure 5 shows. If an adversarial agent enters the cloud via
a subscription, and is assigned VM2, it has the potential
to employ cross-channel attacks against VM1 and VM3,
thereby exploiting the presence of virtual links between dif-
fering VMs. Typically, cloud security controls are deployed
to prevent external attacks rather than insider attacking. This
architecture limits the opportunity to commit further exploits
since the attacker is prevented from moving to the next con-
trol using virtual links. The only option is to proceed using
a real network link by requesting a session in Control A, to
communicate with VMs 4,5 and 6. Since there now exists
Control A, the attacker has to successfully satisfy Tenant
Metadata Inspection in order to proceed with the
penetration. Of course, an orchestrated and sustained attempt
to commit an attack will mean that we should anticipate an
adversarial agent will also have obtained valid credentials,
either by posing as a legitimate tenant or otherwise. In this
case, Control B will have required that the malicious agent
would need to navigate the entire stack of cloud layers before
access could be gained to the analytics interface.
Fig. 5. A hierarchical framework presented as a solution to the attack
scenario in Figure 4.
Fig. 6. The position of the controls at each layer of the hierarchy.
If the attacker has satisfied the cloud validation and meta-
data inspection layers, the only way forward now is to plant
exploits in the hope that these will lie undetected. However,
the Intrusion Protection layer, and the Anti-Malware layer
both offer protection for subversive, covert attacks from the
inside. The result is that our proposed model prevents data
breaches, even when adversarial attacks are launched from
what appears to be genuine service subscribers. We can see
in Figure 6 a sequence in which various security controls
might be instantiated. The security policies of the host system
(or systems) will inform the order in which controls are
implemented, to suit the goals desired by the infrastructure
provider. It is also evident how a tenant’s session is routed
through the various VMs in order to access the relevant
analytics services.
VI. SESSION PACKET INSPECTION
In this section we shall describe a detailed walkthrough
of the security model and explain the use of session packet
inspection.
Referring back to Figure 5, VM1 will host a client that
ultimately will access the enterprise analytics application
hosted in VM7. A malicious agent that has access to either
VM2 or VM3 (or both) can only attack the client of the
analytics application, rather than the application itself. VM2
will be used to test the validity of the VM1 client using a
VM identification number, and assuming that all is well, will
launch a form via VM3 to request details from the tenant.
The details requested from the tenant will vary each time that
VM3 is executed, but they will always refer to some personal
details that can be used to help identify the correct tenant.
Once the form on VM3 has been completed, VM2 will use
the responses to verify the details against those held in the
MetaDB repository. Once the metadata has been verified, the
session can continue. If the malicious tenant has the intention
of acquiring metadata about other tenants, it would need to
deliver an exploit into MetaDB. Whilst it might be expected
that the system is fully patched, it is still conceivable that a
vulnerability exists, enabling an adversary to progress to the
next cloud layer. Since a session cannot be interrupted, any
evidence left by malicious exploits will still remain as the
agent will not be able to remove the incriminating evidence
of the exploit. As such, the attacker can only proceed to
the next layer by exposing that an exploit has been used
to obtain entry. If the malicious agent has obtained private
keys, they still cannot progress without exposing details of
the exploit within the session. Layers 5 and 6 both have the
capability to detect malware, which of course is reliant upon
adequate, proactive security maintenance to ensure that all
exploit databases are current.
It is feasible that an attacker could compromise VMs 3
and 4 with a fresh exploit that has yet to be discovered and
documented, in which case the anti-malware cloud layer will
be unaware of this exploit as well. Whilst this situation may
foil malware detection, there still exists Intrusion Prevention
within the cloud layer, which by its nature monitors and
reports upon anomalies.
Our model enables system architects the ability to add
or subtract security controls as required for a given set of
policies, merely by specifying additional cloud layers for
the hierarchy. When a session is authenticated as satisfying
the requirements of each layer, it can progress to subsequent
layers until the destination application layer is reached. One
advantage of the use of multiple VMs is that much of the
computation can be performed in parallel, and therefore the
majority of packet inspection incurs a minimal overhead in
VMs 2,3 and 4. However, session packet inspection across
cloud layers, especially anything that involves Intrusion Pre-
vention or anti-malware detection will result in an additional
overhead.
A. Mapping controls to the seven layer model
With reference back to the NIST seven layer model [12],
the controls of our proposed model can be mapped to
the PaaS layer as per Figure 7, with the exception of the
firewalls which naturally reside in the IaaS layer [15], [16].
Tenant VMs are hosted in layers 1-3 of the NIST model;
users interact directly with clients that do not store data.
Sessions commence within tenant VMs, before moving to
the application in layer 7 via several layers of verification
and authentication in layers 4 and 5. If the tenant has a
SaaS platform, this will be made available through layer 6,
otherwise all bespoke applications are resident in layer 7.
B. Session flow
The proposed architecture is located on layers 4 (IaaS)
and 5 (PaaS) of the NIST seven-layer model. All firewalls
are categorised as IaaS due to the functionality of verifying
VM instance IDs, and also relating these checks to the
authorisation data provided by a tenant to secure access to
the cloud. Whilst VM IDs are assigned in layers 2 and 3,
access controls are assigned at layer 4. Subsequent controls
are assigned outside of the VM layer, and are primarily
concerned with session packet inspection, for a given session
S. Information is requested directly from the tenant to
satisfy the DBMETA and DBVAULT checkpoint controls, and
is supplemented by DBIPS and DBANTIMAL controls that
perform the session packet inspection function. DBIPS and
DBMETA are therefore categorised as PaaS controls. It is
likely that controls will also exist at the application layer.
For instance, a SaaS instance will require user authentication,
as will a custom enterprise application[8]. User role profiles
are useful in such scenarios to manage different levels of
system access within an enterprise application, to reflect the
role, responsibilities and authority of a particular stakeholder.
VII. ALGORITHM DESIGN
Algorithm 1 describes the sequence of inspections that are
performed within the proposed multi-layer security model.
This algorithm represents the core functionality and can
be augmented as additional cloud layers are defined in
response to the security needs of an organisation. In the case
of a single enterprise the model may tend towards fewer
augmentations. However, enterprises that collaborate, or who
choose to adopt shared services across distributed platforms,
will no doubt adopt additional layers in order to securely
manage service access.
A. Security model logic
Our proposed model seeks to address security concerns in
distributed service applications across heterogeneous hard-
ware resources by enabling session packet inspection to take
place at a number of checkpoints. Each session packet is
scrutinised and compared with a number of repositories such
as DBMETA, DBVAULT, etc. Each inspection stage shall
now be described in turn.
1) DBFW: For each instance, a client initiates a session,
which is inspected as a second stage. This session
will possess a VM ID together with authentication and
authorisation verification data. In addition, the DBFW
must have an entry that relates to the VM ID, otherwise
the session is terminated.
2) DBMETA: A further inspection is then performed to
confirm tenant metadata as requested by the cloud host
Fig. 7. Mapping of the proposed architecture with the NIST seven layer cloud model[12].
Algorithm 1: Multi-layer hierarchical packet inspection
1 Input: S, PCT , (DBFW , DBMETA, DBV AULT ,
DBIPS , DBANTIMAL), 1=permit, 0=deny
2 Tenant session: S
3 Contents of session packets:PCT
4 Contents of FW: DBFW
5 Contents of TENANTMETA : DBMETA
6 Contents of TENANTV AULT : DBV AULT
7 Contents of IPS : DBIPS
8 Contents of ANTIMALWARE : DBANTIMAL
9 Flags: 1=permit, 0=deny
10 Initialise S;
11 Set S = 1, Match(PCT );
12 foreach {DBFW , DBMETA, DBV AULT , DBIPS ,
DBANTIMAL} do
13 if PCT ∈ {DBFW ,DBMETA, DBV AULT } AND
PCT /∈ {DBIPS ,DBANTIMAL} then
14 set S = 1; AuthoriseTenantAccess();
15 //tenant access authorised;
16 else
17 set S = 0; DenyTenantAccess();
18 //tenant access denied;
19 end
20 end
21 Output: S
administrators. Once the metadata has been provided,
this will be added to session packets. The session can
only continue if the session metadata matches that
which exists in the DBMETA repository.
3) DBVAULT: At this stage the VM ID within the session
will be inspected to verify that a private key exists
within the DBVAULT so that encrypted databases can
be accessed.
4) DBIPS: On reaching this stage, the session itself is now
regarded as being fully authenticated and is authorised
to progress to subsequent layers. The next stage is to
inspect the sessions for evidence of potential exploits
that match those held in the DBIPS repository. If a
match occurs, the session is terminated.
5) DBANTIMAL: This stage performs an anti-malware
check, which in conjunction with the DBIPS inspection,
prevents fully authenticated VM sessions being able
to penetrate the upper layers of the security model by
masquerading as legitimate cloud tenants.
The algorithm ensures that after a session is initiated, it
is inspected at each layer, where each layer is represented
by a separate cloud. A key principle is that session packet
data must match the firewall data, tenant metadata and vault
data before a session can be authorised. Furthermore, the
session cannot be granted access to application layers until it
has been successfully screened against IPS and anti-malware
repositories.
B. Implementing the model
For our example scenario, the LAN contains 500 clients.
Each of the clients is assigned three VMs, with an assigned
destination being the tenant client’s metadata repositories
rather than the eventual analytics application. This was a
conscious decision to prohibit any tenant sessions from
attempting to subvert the security and privacy controls of the
cloud. For a physical network, this control would most likely
be enacted by a firewall in an application layer, or as part of
a setting in a virtual network controller. For consistency we
have replicated this by ensuring that the destinations of the
metadata servers are directed towards the tenant vaults; this
is a faithful representation of the intentions of the algorithm,
in that it is governing the marshalling of each session packet
by enforcing checkpoints in a particular sequence. In the
case of a session packet not containing a tenant key that
matches a corresponding entry in DBVAULT, the encryption
key is not assigned and the packets are dropped [21]. We
have represented the adversarial agents as clients who have
the authorisation of a valid tenant, in order to simulate an
attack from within.
VIII. RESULTS
Figure 8 shows the sessions that have been hosted by the
tenant LAN in the simulation. We observed that sessions
only existed within the tenant LAN for tenants that had
matching metadata in DBMETA. It follows that the sessions
that were invoked within the tenant LAN, had consistency
between tenant metadata (DBMETA), tenant vault (DBVAULT),
and the associated VM ID from the initial authentication.
The simulation demonstrated that these validations were
maintained throughout the experiment for all network hops,
illustrating that VMs were complying with their specified
destination configurations, and there was no evidence of VMs
by-passing authentication layers. As such, all security and
privacy control rules are enforced by the model.
VMs initiated by malicious agents have separate profiles
from those of legitimate tenants, even though a malicious
agent may appear legitimate at the outset. This means that
adversaries had distinct metadata and decryption keys in their
vault repositories. We can see in Figure 9 the instances where
a malicious agent’s packets have been dropped as a result
of packet inspection through either the IPS or anti-malware
layers, preventing deeper penetration into the system. As
discussed earlier, an internal attack (an agent with legitimate
DBMETA data) would need to compromise DBVAULT, DBIPS
and DBANTIMAL in sequence if it is to successfully reach the
analytics application layer. Conversely, an authorised tenant
may elect to execute DB sessions on their own LAN, since
the application profiles can include references to their VMs,
as per Figure 10. In such cases, the sessions are authorised
in the sense that they fulfil the relevant rule in Algorithm
1. Since we have chosen to model each of the layers as
clouds, each of the multiple layers can in fact be serviced by
different cloud providers. This architecture thus demonstrates
significant flexibility and is attractive to system architects
who are proactively designing systems that will rely upon
Fig. 8. Client DB sessions on Tenants’ LAN.
heterogeneous hardware and distributed resources, such as
the IoT and IIoT environments. An enterprise may adopt this
security model so that it can take the opportunity to employ
software applications and services that are themselves hosted
on offsite private or community clouds. However, the use of
these services may increase operational costs, although this
is off-set by a reduction in capital expenditure. Operational
costs may also increase indirectly through the maintenance
charges associated with managing the database updates of
five security control layers.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This article proposes a multi-layer hierarchical inter-cloud
security model, that is inspired by the NIST seven-layer
model of cloud computing. By using sequential session
packet inspection techniques, we have demonstrated an archi-
tecture that exhibits considerable resilience towards both ex-
ternal attack as well as more surreptitious internal adversarial
behaviour. Whilst VM vulnerabilities are well documented
in multi-tenant shared environments, our five layers for
packet inspection enables the architecture to identify and
compartmentalise malicious activity. Thus, penetration of a
firewall is in itself insufficient as a means of attempting to
access the application layer, as it is then necessary to create
an evidence trail of exploits that cannot be hidden from the
IPS and anti-malware packet inspection layers. The proposed
model is particularly suited to architectures that have a
requirement to remain flexible for future scaling (which is
often a driver for the adoption of cloud infrastructure), such
as those built upon microservices. Our solution is mapped
Fig. 9. After initial attempts to penetrate the system, IP packets from the
attackers machines are dropped.
to the NIST model in order to assist cloud and IoT system
architects to incorporate this work into their own designs.
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